James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery

5-13-2002

DDASaccident394
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident394" (2002). Global CWD Repository. 594.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/594

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/03/2004

Accident number: 394

Accident time: 15:55

Accident Date: 13/05/2002

Where it occurred: MF: 501, Arid al
Mazra'ah, Nr Bra'Shit

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)
Date of main report: 23/05/2002

ID original source: BoI: 002/2002 MJF

Name of source: MACC SL

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Fuze

Ground condition: not applicable

Date record created: 27/02/2004

Date last modified: 27/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: 36 7265 6730

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
What follows is the original Board of Inquiry report, edited for anonymity and with some
extraneous pictures removed.
REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No002/2002
MINE Accident that occurred in OES 3 on 13th May 2002 in which [Demining group] Deminer
[the Victim] was injured.
Map Reference: UNIFIL Genimap 1:50,000 Sheet A (Tibnin).
References: A. Janes Mines Manual.
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Introduction
1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC
SL Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Monday 13th May 2002, for an
accident investigation Board of Inquiry. Annex A details the Convening Order.
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Mine Accident that occurred
on the 13th May 2002. Based on the investigation, [Demining group]’s internal report, the
statements from [Demining group] personnel involved in the accident (see Annex B), visits to
the accident site and the photos from the accident site, this accident is considered
preventable.
3. The information provided by [Demining group] to the MACC SL QA Section in the “IMSMA
Accident Report”, attached as Annex C is confirmed. The accident occurred at approximately
1555hrs on 13th May 2002, in Minefield (M/F) No 501 at the Arid al Mazra’ah minefield,
Bra’shit. Arid al Mazra’ah minefield is located to the West of Bra’shit at GR 36 7265 6730,
(M/F No 501 Command Post). Annex D details a map of the general area.

Events leading up to the Accident
4. At the time of the accident, [Demining group] Survey Team had completed the survey
operations for the day at M/F 501 clearance site. The Survey Team had been operational on
M/F 501 since the 09th May 2002; the Survey Team were conducting a Level 2 Technical
Survey by means of a series of penetration cuts into the suspect area, in an attempt to
identify the mined area. Annex E details [Demining group] Survey Team Site Clearance Map.
5. On completion of the day’s activities, Team Leader [name excised] had ordered his team to
start preparing the site for departure. The following concurrent activities were taking place:
•

Mine Incineration of the 3 x previously located Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP) mines.

•

The loading of the team demining equipment onto the team vehicle.

•

Movement of the mine fuzes from the explosive storage area to the team vehicle.

Note
[Demining group]’s manual neutralisation technique for the Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP)
mine fuze, at the time of the accident was to attach the collar and insert the pin in the
fuze, only whilst the fuze was being removed from the mine. Once this had been
completed, the collar and pin were then again removed. The fuze would then be wrapped
in tissue paper.
6. Team Leader handed over the mine fuzes to Deminer [B], and ordered him to take the
mine fuzes from the explosive storage area to the team 2i/c Deminer [C], who was loading the
stores onto the vehicle. Deminer [B] took the fuzes to the stores area where upon Deminer [C]
ordered him to place them on the ground sheet, as he was busy with another task, this
Deminer [B] did.
7. Once prepared to load the fuzes, Deminer [C] ordered Deminer [D, the victim] to pass him
the fuzes from the ground sheet, to the vehicle where he was going to put them in the team
detonator box. Deminer [the victim] picked up all 3 x fuzes and laid them on the palm of his
left hand, he then handed the first fuze to Deminer [C] who in turn placed the fuze into the
detonator box.

Events following the Accident
8. At approximately 1555hrs, an uncontrolled detonation occurred in the Command Post.
Following the uncontrolled detonation, the Survey Team Medic [name excised] immediately
assisted [the victim] by applying a shell dressing to his wounded hand. Following full
stabilisation, the casualty was then transported to Bint Jubayl Hospital for medical treatment.
Annex F details a schematic diagram of the accident area / scene.
VIEW OF M/F501 - GENERAL AREA
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Work History of the Casualty
9. [The victim] has been working for the [Demining group] since October 2001. He has
completed the basic Deminers courses and most recently the pre and post, Lebanon
deployment courses. The operation in Lebanon was his first operational deployment. He is
however considered by [Demining group] to be a competent and trustworthy employee;
disciplinary action had never had to be taken against him.

Past History of the Area
10. The Israeli Forces (IF) initially, and later, the South Lebanese Army (SLA) previously
occupied areas in and around Bra’shit. The mine-contaminated areas consist of the following:
•

6 x defensive minefields around the former IF / SLA positions situated at Bal’awin GR
36 7279 6724.

•

2 x protective minefields than run along the Arid al Mazra’ah valley, to the West of the
Bayt Yahun / Bra’shit main road, one being designated M/F 501 by MACC SL.

•

3 x protective minefields to the South and South East of Bra’shit.

11. IF Northern Command reported the minefield details on the 12th December 2001, the
minefield details reported were:
•

No IF minefield designator Number

•

Reference Point GR 36 7279 6726

•

Quantity of 48 Israeli No4 AP mines.

•

Minefield map is available.

12. A previous mine incident occurred in the Arid al Mazra’ah minefield 3 x months previously.
A local farmer inadvertently drove his tractor over an Israeli No4 AP mine; no injuries were
sustained to the farmer.

Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking
13. Task Dossier (TD) OES 3 #002 was issued to [Demining group] on the 24th April 2002;
the TD contains details of 5 x minefields in and around the area. The clearance operation in
M/F 501 commenced on the 09th May 2002 and up to the time of the accident a total area of
913 sq.m had been cleared resulting in the disposal of a total number of 3 x Israeli No4 AP
mines.

Geography and Weather
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14. The task site is located in a natural valley, 3kms South West of the town of Shaqra.
Access to the site is via a stone laid track from the main Bayt Yahun / Bra’shit road. The area
is surrounded to the East, South and West with high ground, the highest feature being Hajar
et Tawil at 768m. The river Burah runs from the South East to the North West through the
valley. The mined area was previously arable agriculture land, used for tobacco and wheat
cultivation; there are no forested areas within the immediate district. The weather at the time
of the accident was fine and sunny with a temperature of approximately 24 to 26 degrees
Celsius.

Site Layout and Marking
15. The site layout marking of the Command Post prior to the accident was in accordance
with National TSGs and Mine-tech SOPs; as was the post accident marking.

Management Supervision and Discipline
16. [Demining group] clearance operation is supervised by an International Operations
Manager and an International Operation Field Manager was in overall charge of Bra’shit task
site. 1 x International Team Leader, commanded the Survey Team. There are no reports of
disciplinary action being taken against [Demining group] personnel on the Bra’shit task.

Quality Assurance and Quality Control
17. [Demining group] Internal Quality Assurance is achieved through a system of on-site
checks by an International QA Team to ensure adherence to National TSGs and [Demining
group] SOPs. External QA is carried out by the MACC SL QA Section. No external QA visit
had taken place on the Survey Team Bra’shit task site, but a “Setting Up” evaluation had
previously been conducted on the Survey Team previous task site at Bayt Yahun on the 08th
May 2002, the evaluation result was good.

Communications and Reporting
18. Communications in-between the Bra’shit task site and [Demining group] base location is
maintained via HF vehicle Codan radios and VHF hand-held Motorola radios. On site
communications in-between teams is maintained via the VHF system.
19. On the day of the accident, the site had proper and appropriate communications and
managed to pass all relevant accident information back to [Demining group] base location,
which in turn passed limited information to the MACC SL via the HF system. Annex G details
[Demining group] Radio Log.

Medical Details
20. [The victim] suffered deep fragmentation lacerations to the insides and tip of his left hand
middle, ring and index fingers, a minor closed fracture of his left hand middle two fingers and
a deep laceration on the inside of his left hand thumb. There was also a small minor
fragmentation laceration to [his] right hand palm. [Demining group] Survey Team Medic
administered medical treatment and stabilisation on-site to [the victim] (wound dressings and
intravenous “Ringer” solution); casualty evacuation by road to Bint Jubayl civilian hospital
then took place.
21. On arrival at Bint Jubayl hospital, [the victim] was transferred to the X-Ray Department
where x-rays of both hands were taken. He was then given 200ml of painkiller (Trodon), an
anti-tetanus injection and an antibiotic injection. The hospital medical report that was
submitted to the BOI is detailed at Annex H to this report. [The Annex was not made
available.]
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22. On the evening of the 13th May 2002, [the victim] was moved to the All-Rassoul AllAazam hospital at Beirut for plastic surgery on the injuries to his hand.
FRAGMENTATION RECOVERED FROM LEFT HAND THUMB

Personnel
23. A list of all personnel and their duties is detailed at Annex B. Written statements from
[Demining group] personnel involved in the accident and [Demining group] internal report form
part of the Appendices to the Annex.

Details of Fuze Involved
24. The Israeli No4 AP mine fuze assembly incorporates a lead-shear arming delay, it is fitted
through a hole in the end of the mine and screwed into the wall of the charge compartment
and sealed with a rubber O-ring. The arming pin protrudes through the end of the mine
opposite the hinge. The arming pin is attached to a pull ring, which is looped over the fuze
body and retained by a plastic cap during transit for additional safety. The striker is retained
and secured by a square shaped slotted plate on which the open end of the box rests.
25. The fuze is designed purely for direct pressure operation. To arm the fuze, the plastic cap
on the end of the fuze is removed to release the pull ring; the arming pin is then removed. The
spring-loaded striker is retained until it has sheared through a lead wire, which runs through
holes in the end of the fuze. The arming process normally takes several hours. Once armed,
the striker is retained only by the slotted plate; pressure on the lid (in excess of 8kgs), simply
pushes the slotted plate out which in turn releases the spring loaded central striker. The
striker then impacts with the integral fuze detonator, which then passes the detonating wave
to the main TNT charge causing the mine to disintegrate. (Paragraphs 24 – 25 inclusive
extracted from Reference A).

ISRAELI NO4 AP MINE FUZE – SIDE VIEW

[The fuze shown was pictured in the original report and does not include the detonator – only
the initiation cap. As a result it is not clear whether the complete detonator was present.]
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Account of Activities
26. The following is a description of the events before and after the accident. The information
from the investigation forms the basis of the description of events:

13/05/02
•

1555hrs – Uncontrolled detonation at M/F 501.

•

1615hrs – Casualty evacuation of casualty to Bint Jubayl hospital.

•

1621hrs – Casualty arrives at the hospital.

•

1755 hrs - Notification of accident to MACC SL.

•

1800hrs – Casualty leaves hospital to move to Beirut hospital.

•

1830hrs – BOI Convened.

•

1900hrs - Notification of accident to NDO.

•

2045hrs – Casualty arrives at Beirut hospital.

•

2300hrs – Casualty moves into theatre for operation on left hand to remove metal
fragments and receive plastic surgery.

14/05/02
•

0130hrs – Casualty leaves theatre.

•

1000hrs – Casualty discharged from Beirut hospital.

•

1300hrs - BOI Arrives at [Demining group] base location.

•

1335hrs – BOI Leaves [demining group] base location to move to accident site.

•

1350hrs – BOI Arrives at accident site to conduct accident investigation.

•

1515hrs – BOI Leaves accident site to move to [Demining group] base location.

•

1530hrs – BOI Arrives at [Demining group] base location to conduct witness
interviews and collate the task information.

•

1700hrs – BOI Leaves [Demining group] base location to move to MACC SL.

•

1800hrs – BOI Arrives at MACC SL.

15/05/02
•

0715hrs – BOI Leaves MACC SL to move to [Demining group] base location.

•

0815hrs – BOI Arrives at [Demining group] base location to conduct interviews with
[the victim] and the Medical Supervisor.

•

1000hrs – BOI Leaves [Demining group] base location to move to MACC SL.

•

1100hrs – BOI Arrives at MACC SL.

Insurance Details
27. [The victim] is covered by the standard [Demining group] insurance for all International
personnel in mine/UXO clearance activities in Lebanon. All insurance policies for [Demining
group] are through HMT Insurers of London.
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Conclusions
28. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of Inquiry
conclude the
following:
•

There was an uncontrolled detonation of an Israeli No4 Anti Personnel mine fuze.

•

At the time of the uncontrolled detonation, no cylindrical collar was attached or safety
pin inserted into the Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP) mine fuze, the fuze was however
had been wrapped in tissue paper

•

[The victim] injuries were sustained from the primary fragmentation, resulting in the
part disintegration of the Israeli No4 mine fuze, on the detonation of the primary high
explosives fill.

•

There is no evidence to ascertain that prior to the accident, [Demining group] on-site
manual neutralisation techniques for the Israeli No4 AP mine were being infringed.

•

The detonator box as used by [Demining group] teams is inappropriate and requires
replacing.

•

An inexperienced Deminer was allowed to handle fuzes / detonators.

•

The medical treatment and subsequent evacuation of the casualty by the on-site
medic was very good

•

The post-accident marking of the accident site was carried out in accordance with
current SOPs.

•

The passage of information in between the accident site and [Demining group] base
location was good, with all relevant information being passed in a timely manner.

•

The passage of the accident information to the MACC SL via HF means was
incomplete and not as per Annex A to [Demining group] SOP No 26.

•

The passage of the accident information to the MACC SL was not within the 30
minute notification time, as detailed in TSGs Chapter 16, Para 16.1.

•

The accident information passed to the MACC SL via the HF means was not
recorded in the [Demining group] radio operator’s log.

•

The BOI agrees with and accepts [Demining group] Accident Report and IMSMA
Report. It should be noted however that there are inaccuracies with regards to the
BOI schematic diagram of the area as detailed at Annex F to this report, and the site
layout diagram as presented in [Demining group]’s Accident Report, Annex B
Appendix 1. The information for the BOI schematic diagram, was obtained from the
Survey Team Leader at the actual accident site.

29. The BOI concludes that the most likely explanation why there was an uncontrolled
detonation, is that the slotted striker retaining plate was either moved or disturbed by [the
victim]. This would have allowed the spring-loaded striker to move forward and impinge on the
detonator.
30. The BOI has not been able to conclude in any certainty, whether this action was a
deliberate foolhardy action, or a genuine innocent mistake.

Recommendations
31. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
•

An amendment be made to the National TSGs for Mine/UXO Clearance, Chapter 4,
Page 4-3, Para 4.13 (Action on Locating a Mine).

•

Cylindrical collars must remain attached, and safety pins must remain inserted into
the Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP) mine fuze, from the time that they are neutralised
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in the minefield up to and including the time that they are destroyed by demolition.
This is to be amended in [Demining group] SOPs.
•

A more appropriate packing material (foam), is used to secure loose fuzes and
detonators, rather than paper tissues.

•

Fuzes and detonators should always be stored and transported in closed metal
containers, from the time that they are recovered on-site until immediately prior to
destruction by demolition. [The box used was shown in a photograph and was a
plastic “lunch-box”.]

•

Suitably approved metal detonator boxes are to be used by all [Demining group]
Clearance Teams. (MACC SL to issue as soon as practically possible).

•

Detonators and explosives are only to be handled by experienced and trained
personnel (Team Leaders).

•

The passage of the accident information to the MACC SL must be complete and as
per Annex A to [Demining group] SOP No 26.

•

MACC SL must be informed of all Accidents / Incidents as soon as practically
possible (30 minutes), as per TSGs Chapter 16, Para 16.1.

•

All radio messages should be logged in the radio log.

•

Only accurate information is presented to any BOI investigation.

•

The conclusions detailed in this report be distributed and discussed among all
[Demining group] Operational Field Staff.

32. It is acknowledged by the BOI, that the second recommendation has already been
actioned by [Demining group].
Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon

Annexes: (not made available)
A. MACC SL convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry.
B. List of personnel involved with attached statements as Appendices.
C. IMSMA Mine/UCO accident report.
D. Map of the general area.
E. [Demining group] Survey Team site map.
F. Schematic diagram of the accident area/scene.
G. [Demining group] Radio Log.
H. Bint Jubail Hospital Report

Comments by the MACC SL Operations Officer
I concur with the recommendations of this report.
My main concerns are:
1. The initial accident report was slow and incomplete, this information should go directly to
MACC SL Operations via the communications room within 30 minutes and not
directly to the QA Officer.
2. The No4 AP mine fuze once neutralised and removed from the mine was handled and
moved without the cylindrical collar and safety pin in place. These 2 x safety features
must remain in place until destruction by detonation.
3. This accident was preventable and the BOI recommendations shall be implemented when
dealing with this fuze, if manual neutralisation is to continue.
Signed: Operations Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon

8

Comments by the MACC SL Programme Manager
I have reviewed the Report of the Board of Inquiry and I concur with the Board’s findings and
recommendations. I recommend that the relevant National TSGs be amended accordingly.
I support the Operations Officer’s comments.
The final Report of the Board was delayed as a result of a third accident occurring. The third
accident is currently under investigation.

Signed: Programme Manager, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon

Victim Report
Victim number: 509

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 26 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: frontal apron, long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Hands
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
No formal accident report was made available. In the Board of Inquiry report it was stated
that:
The victim “suffered deep fragmentation lacerations to the insides and tip of his left hand
middle, ring and index fingers, a minor closed fracture of his left hand middle two fingers and
a deep laceration on the inside of his left hand thumb. There was also a small minor
fragmentation laceration to [his] right hand palm”.
The Victim was moved to the All-Rassoul All-Aazam hospital at Beirut for plastic surgery on
the injuries to his hands.
The photograph of a fragment removed from his hand is further evidence that the injuries
were serious.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “inadequate training” because the victim and
his supervisors were handing fuzes that had not been rendered safe, although it appears that
were working in ways approved by their managers and allowed within their SOPs. The
investigators described him as “inexperienced”, which implies a lack of suitable preparation
for the work. The secondary cause is listed as “inadequate equipment” because the group
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were not using approved means of packing or transporting fuzes. It is likely that they did not
have a suitable supply of fuze collars and pins with which to render them safe to transport.
The investigators declare uncertainty (paragraph 30) over whether “the incident was a
deliberate foolhardy action or a genuine innocent mistake”. No evidence to support the former
possibility is included in the report, but clearly the investigators did harbour the suspicion that
there was some “horseplay” involved.
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